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Abstract: I argue that the discursive tactics used to maintain a clear boundary between 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” service animals rely on a set of assumptions that perpetuate 
unequal relations of power, and ultimately harm others (human and nonhuman alike). In 
support of this argument, I outline my theory of crip spacetime, which draws upon the 
material feminist notion that disability is an intersectional and emergent phenomenon, 
becoming (rather than being) through intra-active environments. Thinking through the 
ontology of service animals and their human companions in terms of crip spacetime demands 
that we apply what Christine Kelly (2016) has called accessible care in relationships.
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I am returning home from the 2016 National Women’s Studies Association 
(NWSA) conference in Montreal, Canada. I arrive at the Columbus International 
Airport, where my partner Johnna will pick me up in a few minutes. Ordinarily I 
would take a car service home from the airport, but this evening I am utterly undone, 
in tears, hardly able to find my way out of the building. I texted Johnna in the middle 
of the night, telling hir what happened, and now ze is on hir way to meet me.
1
  
  
As I step through the outer doors by the baggage claim, into the smell of car 
exhaust and cigarette smoke, I see a sign on the wall through which I’ve just passed: 
 
 
Image description: A greenish-white stenciled 
sign on a glass wall. It comprises three 
sections, arranged vertically. The first section, 
accompanied by a stencil of a medium-sized 
dog with a circle around it and a slash through 
the circle, reads, “No Animals except seeing 
eye / comfort dogs or those being transported 
by air. Proper restraints required.” The second 
section also has a graphic, this time of a 
handgun and a knife being crossed out by a 
circle and a hash mark. The text in the second 
section reads, “No weapons or joking with 
weapons like toys. Violators will be 
prosecuted.” The third section’s graphic is an 
upright stick figure in profile in a wheelchair, 
accompanied by text reading, “This facility is 
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completely accessible to all persons with 
disabilities.” 
 
I offer this sign as a starting point to explore a question that’s been on my mind for 
many years: What is a service animal? I started asking the question because I was personally 
concerned about my own service dog, Ivy—which means I was also concerned about myself. 
But as I continued to ponder Ivy’s and my ways of moving in the world, I realized there are 
larger questions to consider. These include the meanings of “service” and “care”; what it 
means to make care into a site of labor performed by animals; what it means when we 
combine animals’ capacities and disabilities with our own; and what all that might teach us 
about the intersecting qualities of animal, human, and world. In this essay, I explore these 
questions through a theory I call “crip spacetime.” Described in more detail below, crip 
spacetime draws upon both structural and new materialism to explain the ways that disability 
“becomes” through space, time, objects, texts, and organisms. Particularly, crip spacetime can 
be discerned in the tensions, affinities, and violences between and among those—for example, 
as a wheelchair becomes both a gendered person and a body part (see Belser, 2016), or as the 
mineral lead becomes racialized (see Chen, 2012). 
My overall argument is that the discursive tactics used to maintain a boundary 
between “real” and “fake” service animals rely on a set of assumptions that perpetuate 
unequal relations of power, and ultimately harm others (human and nonhuman alike). 
However, this project carries risk, because any attempt to re-define “service animal” has the 
potential to place people and animals at risk of harm in other ways. I take seriously what it 
means to question this definition. Handlers’ lives, not to mention livelihoods, often depend on 
their service animals. The appearance of poorly behaved animals who are claimed as service 
animals does harm to other teams, who are already subject to constant comments, harassment, 
and discrimination (see Siler). Thus, the stakes are high, and I am rethinking with care.  
No Animals 
A different, but more common, starting point could be the legal discourse that 
surrounds and constitutes service animals. According to the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), a service animal is a dog or miniature horse “individually trained to do work or 
perform tasks for a person with a disability.”2 Service dogs and service miniature horses can 
enter restaurants, stores, schools, and public buildings; fly on airplanes and ride buses; live in 
housing where pets are not allowed; and so forth. Legal restrictions are few. If the animal 
“compromises legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation” (e.g. is too 
heavy for a small plane) he may be legally turned away.
3
 Also, if she isn’t housebroken or 
well controlled by the handler, she can legally be refused entrance to a public space such as a 
restaurant. U.S. law specifically forbids asking about service animals if their functions are 
“readily apparent.” Even if the function is not readily apparent, questions are strictly limited, 
and in most cases, no documentation or proof of certification is required. 
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Looking outward from legal definitions, it’s well documented that animals have been 
providing service to humans for thousands of years.
4
 Rebecca J. Huss (2010) notes that “dogs 
were kept at healing temples in ancient Greece,” and that pictures of dogs leading blind 
people have been found in thirteenth-century Chinese scrolls (pp. 1166-1167). This history is 
repeated in many articles about service animals, sometimes with additional details about early 
examples of animals being specifically trained to assist disabled people (Wenthold & Savage, 
2007), and gaining more detailed focus in the period following World War I, when dogs were 
first trained to serve as “seeing eyes” for blind veterans (Eustis, 1927; Eames & Eames, 
2001). As the twentieth century progressed, the forms of care deemed “service” proliferated. 
Animals had been formally trained to work with deaf and Deaf people at least by the 1970s, 
and shortly thereafter were documented as providing service for “depression, panic disorder 
and post-traumatic stress disorder” (Huss, 2010, p. 1169; see also Eames & Eames, 2001). 
With the 1990 passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and its subsequent 
amendment in 2010, the legal definition of “service animal” in the U.S. was codified. 
However, as a flood of reports from scholarly, personal, and popular news sources show, the 
interpretation and enactment of this definition have been anything but simple. 
I mentioned that I have a service dog, Ivy. She’s about nine years old. She also weighs 
five pounds, cannot walk fast due to patellar luxation, and is almost completely blind. When 
she accompanies me to work, on errands, to doctor’s appointments, or on trips, she rides in a 
carrier that hangs by my right hip. Details of her breeding and puppyhood are unknown. I do 
know that she lived the first part of her life in traumatic circumstances (mostly neglected, 
sharing a house with 27 other dogs), after which she was rescued by an organization in north 
Georgia. I adopted her in 2010. 
The details in the previous paragraph may have already disqualified me as a legitimate 
handler of a legitimate service dog in some readers’ opinions. It’s often assumed that 
“service” by an animal requires substantial size and strength. Popular accounts about fake 
service dogs often seem to get in digs about the suspicious nature of small size, as in this 2009 
article quoting a grocery-store worker: “Like when you see little Foo Foo in someone’s purse, 
you know that’s not a service animal” (Yardley, 2009). The crudeness of this attitude is not 
shared by most advocacy and/or training organizations, though, which are well aware that 
service animals come in many sizes, and that their human companions’ disabilities may not be 
immediately apparent. For example, Anything Pawsable, a news and information magazine 
for the service-animal community
5, features an item titled “How Can I Tell if a Service Dog is 
Legitimate?” which argues that the most accurate way to identify a service animal is not 
through size or breed, but through behavior (n.d.). However, Anything Pawsable also includes 
dozens of items aimed at drawing a sharp distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” 
service animals; in fact, the category “Fake Service Dogs” occupies its own page on the site, 
along with “Gear and Equipment” and “Training Tutorials.” The reasons for maintaining such 
a sharp distinction, according to Anything Pawsable, are many: for instance, fake service 
animals may hurt or frighten members of the public because of a lack of training, which “casts 
a shadow on the entire [service animal] community”; they may distract legitimate service 
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animals from doing their jobs; and they may undermine the seriousness of a service animal’s 
purpose in the first place (“The Hidden Complications”). 
In other words, even though Anything Pawsable recognizes that service animals and 
their human companions are extremely diverse, it still emphasizes the importance of 
maintaining a boundary between the real and the fake. That same policing impulse—to draw 
sharp lines between “real” and “fake,” “legitimate” and “illegitimate”—is shared by many 
service animal breeders, trainers, and handlers.
6
 This process is what Ellen Samuels (2014) 
would call biocertification—that is, constantly looping bureaucratic processes which take as 
their goal “the determination of the ‘truth’ of disabled bodies” (p. 123). As Samuels 
emphasizes, these looping processes are never about disability in isolation, but always caught 
up with other often-policed categories, including race, gender, and citizenship. 
Correspondingly, the tactics used to maintain the boundaries around “service animal” draw 
from many intersectional discourses. In the next section, I explore a number of those 
discursive moves, which invoke topics as broad-ranging as health, safety, fitness, obedience, 
excellence, measurement, and dirt. These disparate topics all call forth a similar public 
anxiety about bodies out of place: bodies that don’t look the way they are supposed to, 
function according to standards of “excellence,” excrete in ways considered “dirty” rather 
than properly contained, and so forth. My purpose is to question the governance of animal as 
well as human bodies, and especially the governance of animal-human relations. 
Proper Restraints Required 
I carry a piece of paper everywhere I go: a letter signed by my psychiatrist. 
The letter specifies the tasks Ivy performs, and that I have been diagnosed with “more 
than one serious mental illness listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders 5.” It also lists the nature of the limitations on major life activities 
that my disabilities cause, and describes how Ivy’s tasks mitigate those limitations. 
I rarely mention this letter, even if Ivy and I are challenged as we enter some 
space. Usually, I’d prefer to take a minute to educate the questioner, both for my own 
and for other service-animal companions’ sakes. But if the negotiation becomes 
lengthy or if I’m particularly debilitated that day, I may say something like, “I can 
show you a letter from my doctor,” which almost always resolves the conversation in 
my favor. For some reason the mere invocation of the letter serves as its own 
evidence. 
Crip spacetime as a theory attempts to map the world in terms of the knowledges that 
disabled people have been communicating—to each other, and increasingly, to others—for 
quite some time now. It is not intended as a model, but I do offer it as a corrective to some of 
the concerns about the social model that have led over the past 10-15 years to crip theory, 
cripistemology, and critical disability studies. These concerns often point to a series of overly 
simple divides posited by various versions of the social model, including person/environment 
and impairment/disability, as well as the attempt to collapse all disabled bodies into a single 
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(implicitly white, male, cisgender) figure. In response, crip spacetime turns its focus away 
from the human individual to focus on the spatial, the relational, the non-human animal or 
object, and the group. In crip spacetime, there is no clear distinction between “person” and 
“environment”; rather, disabled life (and death) become through a complex dance of space, 
time, objects, texts, and organisms. In this way, the theory of crip spacetime draws upon 
Karen Barad’s (2007) new-materialist theory of intra-activity. However, crip spacetime also 
draws upon the more structural-materialist point of view of writers like Nirmala Erevelles 
(2011, 2014), who insists that the violences of inequality—for instance, racial and global 
inequalities—must be not only “recognized” but must be at the center of what we understand 
as the becoming process (pp. 28-29). I am not calling for a both/and move, but rather, drawing 
upon Christine Kelly (2016), for an ongoing and hopefully useful ambivalence between these 
two approaches. 
Thinking through situations in terms of crip spacetime demands that we apply what 
Kelly (2016) has called “accessible care” in relationships. This form of care recognizes that 
intimate relationships are always emerging in the context of larger systems of power and 
violence; that we cannot choose sides among independence, dependence, and 
interdependence, but rather must constantly navigate the tension among these concepts; and 
that we must be willing to dwell with a certain amount of ambivalence. Kelly argues, 
“Ambivalence provides breathing room by allowing some of the seemingly irresolvable 
debates to simply remain irresolvable” (p. 40). Accordingly, crip spacetime refuses the desire 
to purify disability into a nugget of information—e.g., “My disability is this, so access (or 
service, or care) will look like that.” Rather, crip spacetime asks us to question notions of 
consistency, individuality, functionality, and coherence when they are applied as evaluative 
tests for who and what should be valued, and in what ways. Moreover, it demands a focus on 
both the particulars of intra-active situations as they unfold, as well as the systems that 
produce and justify unequal, violent relations based on human exceptionalism (Taylor, 2017; 
see also Ferguson, 2013). In the following sections, I apply crip spacetime to a specific 
example, my own service dog, by analyzing the discourses that seek to define “real” service 
animals—as well as other discourses, which resist those boundaries by seeking a more 
capacious way of recognizing service and care from/with animals. 
Ivy would be instantly ruled out as a potential service animal by most breeders and 
trainers. Trainer Kea Grace’s (2016a) article “10 Things That Make a Dog Unsuitable for 
Service Dog Work” names “structural imbalances” and “vision or hearing problems” as two 
of the dealbreakers; Ivy has both. Grace also lists a range of issues Ivy does not have, but 
which similarly resonate with disability and fitness
7: “genetic illness,” being “overweight or 
obese,” and “timidity.” The emphasis on health continues in another article by the same 
author (Grace 2016b): not only should a service animal be housetrained, but any illness 
causing gastric upset should be “very, very, very, very rare.” (This sentence made me pause 
and wonder about illness that might cause only “very, very” or “very, very, very” rare 
occasions of upset.) The importance of near-flawless health and behavior is repeated over and 
over again, not only in Anything Pawsable, but in myriad other publications dedicated to 
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explaining what service animals are and are not. Assistance Dogs International (ADI), for 
instance, puts it this way: 
Assistance dogs have to work to the highest possible standards of health, 
welfare and task work. The standards are a critical guide for all ADI member 
programs and are vital in defining what an assistance dog is.  
With the phrase “what an assistance dog is,” ADI ties excellent behavior and health to the 
very definition of service animal. If a dog is badly behaved or unsound, it’s not just a bad 
service animal—it’s not a service animal at all. 
To be clear, I’m not saying service animals should be incontinent, riddled with 
anxiety, or disruptive. Rather, I’m trying to unearth the assumptions surrounding service 
animals—assumptions about health and fitness, of genetics and breeding, and of 
contamination and safety (including frequent discussion of excrement). These themes reflect 
the arrangements of life and matter identified by Mel Chen (2012) as “animacies”: a 
hierarchichal ordering based upon “understandings of lifeliness, sentience, agency, ability and 
mobility in a richly textured world” (29). Following Chen, I’m interested in how this ordering 
works, and also how it is tied to other orderings having to do with consistency, productivity, 
and safety. If we considered the possibility of a service animal-human relationship that was 
more mobile, even more fragmented—less coherent—than its conventional form, what new 
possibilities might emerge for ways to think about disability (and human animals, and 
animals)? 
Thinking in terms of crip spacetime means recognizing the possibility that a five-
pound, bow-legged, blind rescue dog could be fully fit to participate in a relationship of care 
that qualifies as “real” service. But it also means recognizing that such an investigation may 
do harm as well as good. The presence of service animals in public space is usually fraught, 
and there are good reasons to uphold an image of service animals as near-perfect organisms. 
Companions of service animals are constantly challenged, questioned, and discriminated 
against; meanwhile, the animals themselves are subjected to uninvited greetings and touching. 
Emily K. Michael (2016) tells of moving through the world with her service dog York, 
routinely deflecting people “digging for medical details or distracting York with high-pitched 
puppy talk.” Sometimes, such encounters turn violent, as in Stephen Kuusisto’s (2016) 
“Denied a Cab Ride, Grieving for Who We Are.” In this essay, Kuusisto details the “contempt 
and mean-spirited bullying” he experienced when trying to arrange a cab ride from Detroit to 
Ann Arbor. The story has many painful turns, including this one, which occurs just after 
Kuusisto mentions that he writes for the New York Times: 
He [the cab driver] began shouting that Donald Trump had won the presidency 
and “you people” (apparently meaning blind New York Times readers) “don’t matter 
anymore.” He was absolutely vicious and crowing about how people like me don’t 
matter.  
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Elsewhere in the same piece, Kuusisto describes the driver as “sneering” and “abusive.” And 
his story is not an anomaly. Advocacy sites and message boards within the service-animal 
community offer thousands of other examples. Moreover, harassment may be the least of a 
companion’s problems: her life, not to mention her livelihood, may depend upon her service 
animal remaining undistracted and unthreatened. Little surprise, then, that disabled people are 
sometimes among the fiercest defenders of a clear line between “real” and “fake,” “fit” and 
“unfit” service animals. 
And yet it is also disabled companions of service animals—including Kuusisto (1998; 
forthcoming) and Michael (2016)—who write about this relationship with the most subtlety 
and the deepest attunement to “becoming” in company. Rod Michalko (1999) calls the 
relationship “The Two-in-One”: 
At one time, I am master; at another, [guide dog] Smokie is. Now I am handler, 
now he is. … This is a fluid relation that does not apply when leader and follower are 
understood as static and completely separable entities. Thus mastery, handling, and 
ownership are situated phenomena and not ontological ones. … We move together as 
one, touching and imagining both each other and our world. (p. 185)  
The relation Michalko describes is strikingly like the intersectional process of “becoming” 
discussed by Erevelles (2011, 2014). Note that Michalko describes himself and Smokie as 
“imagining both each other and our world.” Moreover, though it was published almost 20 
years ago, Michalko’s description of himself and Smokie as bringing one another and the 
world into being resembles Barad’s (2007) theory of intra-activity. Pre-existing human and 
pre-existing animal do not come together in a pre-existing environment; rather, the relation 
constitutes human, animal, and the matter of the world. 
But becoming is not a neutral process (Erevelles, 2011, 2014). It unfolds through and 
because of unequal, often violent, histories. For animals, those histories include subjugation, 
torture, and neglect, as well as (in the case of dogs) a long entanglement with humans through 
which the two species became mutually reliant (see Taylor, 2017). For humans, those 
histories include colonial violence, ableism, and racism, as Erevelles explains, as well as a 
struggle to figure out how we understand ourselves, other animals, and objects as members of 
what Kelly Oliver (2016) calls “the moral community” (p. 248; see also Ferguson, 2013). 
I have been wondering “What is a service animal?” (and “What is service?” and 
“What is care?”) because these questions demand that I also ask what it means to be (or 
rather, become) a disabled human in the world. Oliver (2016) points out that attempts to 
police boundaries between humans and animals through criteria such as functionality or 
sentience lead to “the nonproductive type of line-drawing” that inevitably seems to end in 
declaring a hierarchy of ways to exist (p. 253). I want to take up Oliver’s suggestion that we 
understand people and animals through a version of feminist care that emphasizes “an ethics 
of proximity” (p. 242; see also Ferguson, 2004). This form of care might move beyond an 
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individualistic model of “service”—one animal, one human—to consider more complicated 
forms of collective care. But it would also consider the material costs of doing so. 
Comfort 
Mid-November 2016. The NWSA conference-goers, thousands of us, arrive in 
Montreal reeling from Donald Trump’s election just a few days before. We invoke it 
in our presentations, we tell stories about how we learned the news, we organize 
resistances, we cry. We hold onto each other longer than usual when we meet and 
when we say goodbye. Many of us avoid the windowless session rooms with their 
rows of front-facing chairs, sitting instead in small groups, talking, touching each 
other. We seek comfort. 
Ivy is not with me, for complicated reasons. I hesitated over the decision. I had 
to weigh it against the stress that the trip would have placed upon both of us—
particularly since it involved crossing an international border—and I ended up 
deciding to leave her home. (One of the ironic things about being accompanied by an 
animal whose job is to ameliorate panic is that the constant questioning and periodic 
harassment that flare up in her presence may actually bring on panic.) Only after I 
arrive at NWSA, when my friends express sorrow at Ivy’s absence, do I realize that 
she could have comforted them as well. 
The term “comfort animal” is archaic, but still crops up with surprising regularity—for 
instance, stenciled on the glass wall of the Columbus, Ohio airport. It vibrates with notes of 
domesticity and home culture (“comfort food”); of violent transnational and sexual histories 
(“comfort women”); of animals themselves (“creature comforts”). If the term didn’t make me 
so uncomfortable, I might even claim it, since comforting is one of Ivy’s most important jobs. 
But comfort is not supposed to be a service animal’s job—or “task,” as it is defined by 
U.S. law. A service animal, according to C.F.R. § 36.202, must “do work or perform tasks” 
for a person with “a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability.” 
Comfort is, in fact, explicitly outlawed, according to Title III: 
The crime deterrent effects of an animal’s presence and the provision of 
emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or 
tasks for the purposes of this definition.  
This emphasis on “work or tasks” is frequently used to govern the difference between 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” service animals. Joan Esnayra, founder of the Psychiatric 
Service Dog Society, notes that ADA lawsuits may be won or lost on the word “task”: “If you 
say ‘comfort,’ ‘need,’ or ‘emotional support,’ you’re out the door,” she is quoted as saying in 
a 2009 New York Times article. “If you talk about what your animal does in terms of ‘tasks’ 
and ‘work,’ then you stand a chance” (Skloot, 2009). 
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The distinction between service animals and emotional support animals (ESAs) is 
similarly defined in terms of work or tasks, and comprises a curious web of overlaps and 
differences. While service animals may enter more spaces, they must be dogs or miniature 
horses; by contrast, an ESA may be any species. The variety of species permissible as ESAs 
has led to a number of sensationalized news stories reporting on claims made on behalf of 
ferrets, iguanas, ducks, pot-bellied pigs, monkeys, cats, goats, boa constrictors, kangaroos, 
and parrots. Patricia Marx (2014) wrote a first-person account that describes obtaining a letter 
from a “therapist type” and then entering various public spaces with (one at a time) a turtle, a 
snake, a turkey, an alpaca, and a pig. Marx’s piece is written for comic effect, but her tone is 
often dismissive, if not sneering. For example, she notes that the National Service Animal 
Registry recorded 11,000 emotional-support animals in 2013, then asks, “What about the 
mental well-being of everyone else?” 
Although pieces like Marx’s are meant to be taken lightly, their appearance signals a 
growing sense that the proliferation of many different kinds of ESAs (including reptiles and 
rodents), combined with legal confusion over which kind of animal qualifies for what, may be 
undermining and endangering people with “legitimate” service animals (Kogan et al., 2016; 
Skloot, 2009; Teitell, 2013). As a result, organizations that advocate for service animals and 
their companions have doubled down on their exacting definitions of “task,” “work,” and 
“support,” in an effort to debunk widespread charges of fakery. For example, Please Don’t 
Pet Me, an advocacy site founded and maintained by service-animal handlers, offers a 
dedicated article on “Understanding the Differences Between Tasks and Work,” while 
Anything Pawsable offers a full article to distinguish between “tasks” and “natural behavior.” 
Attempts to define “task” often link this concept to another one: trainability. Anything 
Pawsable quotes trainer Susan Lilly Grace: “Any behavior offered by the dog that isn’t 
directly trained and linked to a cue is considered a natural behavior” (McCormack, 2015). 
Thus, if a disabled person begins to shake from anxiety, and her dog jumps on her lap in a 
comforting way through his own initiative—but not because he was trained to do so on that 
specific cue—that is a “natural behavior,” not a “task.” This trainer also mentions that 
“companionship” and “emotional support” don’t count as tasks, because they cannot “easily 
be verified on a specific cue.” 
That argument isn’t hard to agree with if the task in question is something that can be 
physically observed, such as jumping on a person’s lap. However, if we think about less 
easily observable behaviors, where does “task” end and “natural behavior” begin? For 
example, let’s return to Susan Lilly Grace’s point about the “natural” behavior of a dog trying 
to comfort his human companion. What if the comfort required is not periodic (and thus cue-
able), but constant? I clicker-trained Ivy, and I know that in order to cue a dog, you need at 
least two things (besides the clicker): you need an occasion on which the dog is doing the 
behavior (the “task”), and you need an occasion on which the dog is not doing it. As the 
trainer, you must click at the very instant the behavior occurs. Your dog learns that hearing a 
“click” means Right! Yes, that! That thing you did at that exact moment! So if I click for Ivy 
 REVIEW OF DISABILITY STUDIES: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
Volume 13 
 Issue 4 
 
 
Page 10 
 
just as her hindquarters touch the floor on a sit, the sound tells her Hindquarters on floor=you 
met the goal. According to clicker-training methods, a reward should follow the clicking, so 
that your animal remains invested in the training. But the click itself is not the reward; rather, 
it’s a signal of when the rewardable behavior occurred, and an assurance that a reward will be 
forthcoming at some point.
8
 
But at what point does providing support or comfort become a task? The desire not to 
engage this question leads to murky, sometimes rather tortuous, use of language. For example, 
the ADA National Network explains that ESAs “sometimes help with depression, anxiety, 
and certain phobias, but do not have special training to perform tasks that assist people with 
disabilities.” (As a trainer, it is tempting to imagine perverse versions of cue-able “tasks” that 
would transform this “help” into “service”—for example, if an animal does silly tricks on cue, 
thus making the depressed or anxious person laugh and feel better, is she now a service 
animal?) The ADA National Network document attempts to clarify the “task/support” 
distinction by explaining that a psychiatric service animal’s tasks might include “reminding 
the handler to take medicine, providing safety checks or room searches, or turning on lights 
for persons with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, interrupting self-mutilation by persons with 
dissociative identity disorders, and keeping disoriented individuals from danger.” Some of 
these are easily recognizable as individual tasks that can be trained and cued; others, such as 
“keeping from danger” might be more difficult to pick out. As someone who is routinely 
disoriented with brain fog and cognitive delays, I can testify that one of the most disorienting 
features of disorientation is that you often don’t realize you’re disoriented, or to what extent. 
Ivy certainly helps keep me from danger in such situations, but not usually because I’ve given 
her a specific cue. 
Tasks performed by psychiatric service animals seem to present particular difficulty to 
those attempting to interpret the “thicket” of laws and regulations surrounding service animals 
(Lipka, 2011). An article aimed at helping university counselors form policy, for example, 
explains that a psychiatric service animal might “prevent” compulsive or destructive behavior 
(Kogan et al., 2016). Is “preventing” something a task, if that task must be cue-able? It’s not 
hard to see that one could make an argument for “preventing” in terms of observable, 
identifiable moments—e.g. pulling someone’s hand from their mouth if they’re biting their 
fingers, or preventing them from stepping into a busy street if dazed. But it also seems evident 
that “keeping from,” “preventing” (as well as “soothing” or “calming”) might not be easily 
identifiable, and cues might not be easily demonstrable. Or, to put it another way—at what 
point does “help[ing] with depression” become “preventing self-harm or suicide”? If the 
presence of an animal causes self-harm or suicide not to begin in the first place, where is the 
task? 
Perhaps in an effort to de-emphasize the complicated “task/natural behavior” division, 
many advocacy sites suggest that service animals’ realness is related to the length of the 
training process. For example, Please Don’t Pet Me notes that “Service dogs receive hundreds 
of hours of socialization, advanced obedience training and formal training to perform the jobs 
 REVIEW OF DISABILITY STUDIES: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
Volume 13 
 Issue 4 
 
 
Page 11 
 
for which they were intended.” No matter how well-trained a pet might be, this article 
explains, it almost certainly has not been through those hundreds (or thousands) of hours of 
learning how to work. But a certain amount of slippage persists, unremarked, in that 
argument. For example, what if the human companion’s needs are not so complicated, and 
training could be briefer? Does that mean the needs themselves are less urgent, the disability 
itself less severe? Do all human companions need to be disabled in ways that require 
excellence from our animals? The argument for excellence is compelling, since it is tied to the 
more general public attitude toward service animals and companions (who, as noted earlier, 
often experience discrimination and harassment). Many publications, including Please Don’t 
Pet Me, remind the reader that inappropriate behavior on the part of a service animal creates a 
“ripple effect” that has negative consequences for all service-animal teams. 
And yet, I want to ask—are those really the terms on which we want to defend 
ourselves, going forward? Is unswerving excellence (except on “very, very, very, very rare” 
occasions (Grace, 2016b)) an acceptable price for being allowed to travel, go to school or 
work, receive medical care, and participate in cultural events? Is that how we want to pursue 
the argument about our own value as disabled people? For that matter, has it ever worked for 
any oppressed group to try to maintain perfection as the price of admission? It makes sense to 
me that one should not visit a restaurant accompanied by a dog who habitually craps on the 
floor.
9 
But is it crucial that the animal be flawless, or nearly so? There seems to be an 
alarmingly eugenic discourse at work, through which the hardworking, genetically optimal, 
perfectly behaved service animal is held up as a standard for all disabled people and their 
animal companions. 
The current system of defining service animals assumes that humans have clearly 
recognizable disabilities, which open up specific needs, which in turn can be met by the work 
of a service animal (its tasks). But if we think about the complex, caring relationship between 
service animals and their human companions in terms of crip spacetime, the bright lines 
between human-disability-need-animal-task dissolve. In fact, every service-animal companion 
I’ve consulted with in the writing of this article acknowledges a subtler, more nuanced 
relation between themselves and their animals than legal or even public definitions would 
allow. The lived experience, as my friends and acquaintances describe it, makes room for 
ambivalence. Insistence on clear lines between “real/fake” or “natural behavior/task” tends to 
arise in response to the external violence of discrimination that is the daily experience of most 
service animals’ companions. In other words, most people with service animals whom I know 
personally tend to regard the relationship as intra-active: emergent, fluid, a becoming-
together. But they also recognize the violence that is part of that becoming. 
No Weapons 
I stand on the sidewalk outside the Columbus airport, breathing the damp, 
chilly air filled with car exhaust. I am almost nonfunctional. That’s why I noticed the 
sign in the first place: I am moving slowly, not processing anything aural, and staring 
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at things I wouldn’t ordinarily notice, like the lines between the squares of linoleum on 
the floor, or signs painted on glass walls. 
I am in this state—drifting and dull, post-panic-attack—because the person in 
the seat behind me on the plane was drunk and violent. He spent the flight rocking in 
his seat, occasionally punching my seat, and saying “Fucking cunt” about the flight 
attendant when she refused to serve him any more alcohol. The flight attendant 
departed the back of the plane for a safer area, while the man continued to swear and 
occasionally punch my seat. I froze, lost my breath, and didn’t move or turn around. 
After the plane landed, I waited until he was gone. Then I asked the flight attendant if 
I could file a complaint. 
I won’t detail the process of attempting to make that complaint. I talked to the 
gate agents, then their red-jacketed supervisor, then (fifteen minutes later) the police 
officer they said had to be called because the airline (Delta) couldn’t do anything. By 
the time the police officer arrived, the drunk man had left the gate, the flight attendant 
had climbed back onto the plane and flown away, and the officer laughed at me and 
said, “Well, what do you want me to do about it?” I looked at his badge and he said, 
“You can look at my badge number all you want, it won’t do you any good.” Then I 
decompensated and was unable to speak for a while. I remember the officer asking 
(not kindly), “You want me to call you an ambulance?”, to which I shook my head and 
walked away. I remember leaning against a wall and texting Johnna to come pick me 
up. I remember that I couldn’t see very well, but I found the escalators and the moving 
sidewalk that led me to the baggage claim. I stepped on the pad in front of the 
automatic doors, moved outside into the fume-filled air, turned back to look at the 
glass wall, and saw the sign. 
Johnna arrives with both our dogs in the car. Maybe I wouldn’t have 
decompensated if Ivy had been with me, or maybe I still would have. Maybe the 
officer would have taken me more seriously if I’d had a marked service animal by my 
side—or maybe less so. Maybe the presence of a small dog would have made the 
drunk man less violent, or maybe more so. I don’t know. I do know this: When Johnna 
arrives with the dogs, I am not in need of my service animal specifically. I just need 
anyone—preferably everyone—in my family. 
On the sign whose image I showed at the beginning of this article, discourses of 
violence (“No weapons or joking with weapons like objects. Violators will be prosecuted”) 
are tucked between the top statement (“No Animals”) and the abruptly utopian turn of the 
bottom statement (“This facility is completely accessible to all persons with disabilities”). 
Interestingly, only the middle statement—with its images of a gun and a knife, and its 
unsubtle reminder that even “joking” about weapons is grounds for detainment—mentions 
actual prosecution. Although the top statement also warns against illegal activity, it does not 
mention any consequences. In fact, the subject of those first two sentences is entirely absent, 
from a grammatical point of view. But in the statement about weapons, potential lawbreakers 
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are named: they/we are “Violators.” Paraleptic non-mentions of race, nationality, violence, 
and policing appear between the lines of this sign as “shadows”—affective elements present 
but unnamed (Adams & Erevelles, 2015). 
Those same shadows hang over all animals in U.S. airports, including the pets and 
ESAs and service animals waiting with their companions in the security line; the police dogs 
moving quietly beside their handlers; and the thousands of human animals thronging the halls 
and trying to get somewhere else. Some shadows are cast from hundreds of years ago, some 
from the present day: dogs used as weapons and tools of surveillance; Lynndie England 
holding a leash while dragging a man by the neck in Abu Ghraib prison; the comparisons 
made between Michael Vick’s appearance and that of a pit bull (Weaver, 2015). All human-
animal relations are shadowed by the cultural process Barad calls “thingification” (2003, p. 
812). For example, as Sunaura Taylor (2017) documents, European and American sideshows 
of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries featured acts such as Ape Girl and Jo-Jo the Dog-Faced Boy, 
which “played out the various colonial and scientific dramas of their time.” In these shows, 
Taylor recounts, “animality was front and center—with the most demeaning of animal 
comparisons being reserved for people of color and for intellectually disabled people” (p. 
104). The medical-scientific logics used in the becoming of race and disability were also 
logics that transformed people into animals, and animals into objects, and objects into 
despised, unworthy matter. Indigenous and feminist versions of object-oriented ontology both 
point out and resist these violent processes, while simultaneously emphasizing the importance 
of recognizing agency in nonhuman actors (see Kristen Arola, 2017; Kim TallBear, 2011). If 
one is attuned to these histories, it is eerie to note the implications in the words of Dorothy 
Harrison Eustis’s Saturday Evening Post article from 1927: “The dog must have perfect 
obedience and yet he cannot be a machine.” 
Animals and objects cannot ethically be used as stand-ins for that which we wish to 
posit as less-than. Rather, we must acknowledge humans, animals, and objects as differently 
valuable entities (Gibson, 2006; Haraway, 1991, 2008; Kafer, 2013; Kim, 2015, 2016). In 
some cases, we may observe that objects have animal-like or human-like qualities; in others, 
that we ourselves are animal-like and object-like, without allowing that observation to signal 
“a necessarily degraded status that licenses violence” (Kim, 2016, p. 141. See also Belser, 
2016; Taylor, 2017). My call to crip care in the service animal-human relationship is fueled 
by more than a general sense that it’s the right thing to do. It is also fueled by my conviction 
that if we do not work our way toward a more capacious, more fully relational understanding 
of what a service animal is (and thus, what we ourselves are), we will continue to perpetuate 
the violences that accompany the hierarchization of animacies (Chen, 2012). We will literally 
be saying that some animals are more equal than others. 
Is there room to recognize, both theoretically and materially, that perhaps we could 
move away from the assumptions of unswerving excellence, cleanliness, and hyper-ability 
that characterize most legal and institutional definitions of “service animal”? Can we take up 
the possibilities, and also the costs, of a less controlled proliferation? I am inspired by Emily 
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K. Michael’s investigation into the many encounters she manages every day as she moves 
through the world with York. Michael points out that, although people’s endless questions can 
get tiresome, they also reveal “patterns of thinking about the more-than-human world.” She 
notes that many people comment sadly that they miss their own dogs, and rather than taking 
this as an opportunity to emphasize the difference between the carefully-trained York and 
others’ (presumably) not-as-thoroughly trained dogs, Michael takes a different turn. She asks: 
What if humans did have animals accompanying us more routinely into public spaces? How 
might our spaces change, and how might humans’ relations to one another and to animals 
change as well?
10
 
At the close of her book Beasts of Burden, Sunaura Taylor (2017) states that that for 
several years she had a service dog, Bailey, who then became disabled because of spinal 
surgery. Now, she writes, “[My husband] David and I are undoubtedly Bailey’s service 
humans” (p. 223). And yet, Taylor points to this relationship not as the end of Bailey’s work 
as her service animal, but as an extension of it: 
There is a sense of something appropriate—beautiful actually—about being a 
gimped-up, dependent, inefficient, incapable human supporting and being supported 
by my inefficient, dependent, and gimped-up dog. … Awkwardly and imperfectly, we 
care for each other. (p. 223)  
Taylor would be the last person to suggest that this awkward, imperfect relationship should be 
taken as a generic ideal. Bailey might not, of course, be the right “fit” for a different disabled 
person. But Taylor’s relationship with Bailey fits her, fits him, fits their world, and is a form 
of care that should be valued—in legal and institutional as well as personal ways. There is 
room for many kinds of service animals in the world. Acknowledging this means not only 
recognizing a different kind of care in human-animal relations, but caring about those 
relationships differently as well. 
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Mad at School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic Life (University of Michigan, 
2011) won the Outstanding Book Award from the Conference on College Composition and 
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Endnotes 
1. My thanks to the human companions who have helped me develop and revise this piece: 
Kennan Ferguson, Emily Michael, Rod Michalko, Bethany Stevens, Sunaura Taylor, 
Tanya Titchkosky, and Melanie Yergeau. Thanks also to Ryan Sheehan for his extensive 
research support, and to the reviewers and editors who have made this piece so much 
better. Any remaining errors of fact or judgment are mine. 
2. Laws governing service animals in the U.S. include C.F.R. § 36.202; the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), including its 2010 amendment; the Fair Housing Amendments 
Act (FHAA); and the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA). The Department of 
Transportation’s Guidance Concerning Service Animals in Air Transportation (2003) is 
also often cited. Laws outside the U.S. vary; Assistance Dogs International (ADI) and the 
International Association of Assistance Dog Partners provide information about 
international law. 
3. When referring to unspecified service animals in the singular, I use the pronouns “he” and 
“she” by turns. 
4. Unless otherwise specified, “animal” in this article refers to “nonhuman animal.” 
5. Eames & Eames (2001) document the emergence of a subculture of disabled people who 
are partnered with service animals, particularly dogs. 
6. In addition to the potential harms to animals/handlers noted earlier, the appearance of 
animals in public space may harm those who are debilitated by phobias, allergies, or other 
problems that make it difficult or impossible to be around some kinds of animals. In 
exploring what it might mean to crip the definition of service animal, I do not mean to 
argue that its potential problems are unimportant. Harm and pain are important, and 
should receive more attention in new-materialist theories. 
7. By “fitness,” I mean a metaphorical fitting/misfitting, as defined by Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson (2011): a “material arrangement” through which a body/object is more or less 
congruent with the surrounding, and shifting, circumstances (p. 594). 
8. This description is a very brief overview of one positive-reinforcement training approach. 
My thanks to Sharon Wachsler and Caroline (CMoore) Moore, who introduced me to this 
method, helped me find books and resources on the subject, and offered feedback on my 
training videos. 
9.  Since I’m in the habit of thinking about limit cases, even this example doesn’t seem so 
terribly extreme when I consider the fact that I am routinely expected to swim in public 
pools that babies and children have both urinated and defecated in, to touch doorknobs 
and elevator buttons teeming with fresh bacteria, and to shake hands with people who 
have recently been sneezing, coughing, wiping their faces, and picking their teeth. In 
general, human bacteria and environmental toxins are a greater threat to me than a dog 
taking a shit in my vicinity. For more on the complications of dirt, contagion, and toxicity 
in public space, see Mel Chen (2012, 2014) and D Adams and Nirmala Erevelles (2015). 
10. As noted above, an abundance of animals in public space would not be an unqualified 
good. People with phobias or allergies, for example, might be harmed. My point is not that 
we should create a sort of hipster utopia, with dogs sitting on barstools beside their human 
companions (as much as that image might charm me personally). Rather, I want us to re-
think the ways animals are allowed to be part of our systems of care, particularly when 
those systems insist on rigid definitions of disability and need. 
